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Family business development in mainland China (1872–1949) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study reviews family business in mainland China from 1872 to 1949 and provides evidence 
of its early development and its origins in 1872 when the first modern manufacturing firm was 
founded. We analyse the social, economic, and political environment in which family firms in 
mainland China were embedded to improve our understanding of how this unique organisational 
form was established and developed. Our analyses cover the late Qing Dynasty and the period from 
1912 to 1949 during which the Republic of China ruled mainland China. Implications for current 
family business theory and practice are discussed. 
Keywords: Family business; Mainland China; Early development; Late Qing dynasty. 
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Introduction 
 
The creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 led to what has been described as 
the capitalist dilemma – how to adapt, develop and survive during the transformation of private 
enterprise into state-owned firms.1 Three decades later, in 1978, when the government introduced 
its open-door policy, family-owned and managed enterprises re-emerged in mainland China. These 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – mostly privately held – expanded exponentially, 
especially in the coastal provinces and the Special Economic Zones.2 At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the establishment of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen saw the listing of a number of 
these family firms, including the cross-listing of some of them on foreign stock exchanges. 
While extensive research has brought more attention to these family firms,3 relatively little is 
known about family firms before 1949, especially from an historical perspective. Our study is 
intended to fill this gap. 
Family ownership is the dominant form of organisation around the world,4 and the Chinese 
family firm has been a primary focus of Chinese business history research.5 As Zelin points out, 
Chinese family firms are generally perceived to ‘have been organised as simple partnerships, 
relying on household capital and the resources of kin and friends, demonstrating little separation of 
ownership and control, and providing neither clear separation between the claims of business and 
personal creditors, nor protections for the firm against claims by individual creditors against 
individual partners’6 (p. 624). This perception is true for many Chinese family firms around the 
world. However, Chinese family business has never been a homogeneous form; such businesses 
founded by Chinese (individuals, families, immigrants) in other countries could be quite different 
from family businesses founded and operating in mainland China. In mainland China, over a 
century of ‘colonialism, war, revolution, political turmoil and economic uncertainty’7 has provided 
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a rich institutional environment in which family firms are embedded. Drawing upon this 
institutional c o n t e x t  allows us to gain a better understanding of the evolvement of family 
business in China.  
In parallel with the economic transformation within the PRC, the last three decades have 
seen the growth of ‘Chinese business history’. We do not intend to retrace this rich literature, 
especially debates regarding the great divergence and the emergence of industrial capitalism in 
Europe and the failure to achieve this industrialisation in China.8 Neither do we intend to show why 
it took China so long to establish a suitable institutional environment to facilitate enterprise 
development.9 Instead we focus on the historical development of Chinese family business in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to improve our understanding of the current context 
in which Chinese family business operates.  
Second, conventional wisdom holds that domestic business in China during that period was 
not able to compete with firms from abroad and lacked modern infrastructure and technologies. New 
evidence based on rigorous econometrics, however, paints a different picture. Zeitz compares the 
productivity among Japanese-, British- and Chinese-owned firms in the textile industry. 10  His 
evidence indicates that Chinese local firms actually outperformed their British counterparts in cotton 
spinning, despite the fact that British firms had the most advanced technology. As Chan points out,11 
successful Chinese family businesses were able to build on managerial techniques borrowed from 
abroad, take into consideration the unique cultural and societal environment in China, and develop 
new forms of organisation and management. Similarly, Cochran’s intriguing analysis of the Liu 
family correspondence demonstrates how the family patriarch, Liu Hongsheng, was motivated to 
send his children to be educated abroad and encouraged their independent thinking. 12  Yet, his 
children were also expected to return to China to apply their Western knowledge to the running of 
family enterprises. We intend to highlight how Chinese family firms adapted to the new institutional 
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environment, and answer the question: Did Chinese family firms simply conform to a Western style 
of management or structure, or did they show creative adaptation in starting their family business? 
Third, Kirby argues that Chinese family business had its roots in networks of family and other 
social ties,13 and therefore may present capitalism with Chinese characteristics. Meissner examines 
the competition between American flour makers and local Chinese companies in the Shanghai flour 
milling industry,14 and shows that Chinese companies indeed adopted alternative strategies and 
collaborated during the crisis to survive. 
In summary, our study makes three contributions to the emerging literature on Chinese 
family business. First, to our best knowledge, this study is the first to provide a relatively holistic 
picture of family firm evolvement in mainland China from 1872 to 1949, prior to the founding of 
the PRC. While previous research has examined Chinese family firms in Greater China and in 
other jurisdictions,15 family business history in mainland China, especially over a longer historical 
horizon, is under-studied. Second, while commercial industries have been examined in the 
literature,16 we focus on manufacturing, beginning in 1872 when the first modern, family-run 
manufacturing firm was established. Third, our work responds to the call by Chua and Chrisman 
for more research into family business in mainland China, given its rich cultural and socio-political 
environment.17 Family businesses in the PRC have a relatively short history. Such firms did not 
start to emerge until 1978 when the economic reform began to take effect. Historical insights 
into and understanding of family business in mainland China provide important implications for 
current theories and practices of family businesses.18
 
In particular, to our best knowledge, this 
study is the first to examine the implications of wars on Chinese family business, in particular the 
impacts of the Sino-Japanese wars and the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and 
the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, KMT). 
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Our analyses draw on perspectives from recent research on Chinese history, business 
development, and social change, both in English and in Chinese. We examine significant events 
and developments in chronological order, illustrating our arguments through the use of examples 
drawn from individual family businesses in mainland China. While not exhaustive, we highlight 
some distinctive features of Chinese family business in the late Qing and early Republican eras, 
especially their organisational structures and management strategies to survive and grow amid an 
extremely adverse competitive environment. Family firms in China currently face similar pressures 
from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign multinational corporations. As a result, insights 
gained from looking into Chinese family business from a century ago may provide important 
implications for present-day enterprises. 
The remainder of this article unfolds as follows. We first discuss the adoption of family 
ownership structures, followed by the specific examination of family businesses in the late Qing 
dynasty (1872–1911). Next, we analyse family businesses during the period of the Republic of 
China on the mainland from 1912 to 1949, consisting of four sub-periods: 1912–1920, 1921–1936, 
1937–1945, and 1945–1949. We then offer concluding comments and outline possibilities for 
further research. 
 
 
Family business in the late Qing Dynasty (1872 to 1911) 
 
 
 
Family businesses have a long tradition in China, especially during the Ming and Qing 
dynasties,19 but the selection of a family business structure is an endogenous choice. Chinese 
businessmen may have opted for this structure for several reasons. First, as pointed out by 
Goetzmann and Köll, despite the fact that the Shanghai Stock Exchange for foreign companies was 
one of the most active markets around the globe, the market for domestic Chinese companies failed 
to become an effective means to raise capital. Lack of access to capital may have forced private 
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Chinese businessmen to operate as family firms as this organisational structure enabled them to 
raise capital through kinship and social ties. Second, business families were more likely to pursue 
non-economic goals, i.e., socio-emotional wealth;20  the inclusion of other shareholders in the 
company could have compromised their control of the firm, thus making the preservation of socio-
emotional wealth more challenging. Family control could have been more important in China, than 
in other contexts, given its societal and cultural distinctiveness. Notwithstanding this 
distinctiveness, recent research confirms that family control was more nuanced than often 
portrayed in the literature, especially in terms of the balance between patriarchal structures, filial 
devotion and intergenerational empowerment. 21  This nuance cautions us to ensure that 
interpretations of the social and cultural distinctiveness of Chinese family business do not become 
romanticised or ‘orientalised’.22 Finally, that Chinese family business had its roots in networks of 
family and family involvement only seems natural.23 Forming a family business may have helped 
to avoid state control and government predation. Government control and policies can be seen as 
key factors impeding family business during the Qing Dynasty. 
The Qing Dynasty was the second dynasty in Chinese history founded by a national 
minority group, and was the last imperial dynasty of China. Nurhachi, a leader of Jurchen, founded 
Houjin in 1616, and his son, Huang Taiji, changed Jin to Qing in 1636. The Ming Dynasty, which 
preceded the Qing Dynasty, ended in 1644 when a peasant revolt occupied Beijing and established 
a short-lived Dashun Dynasty. Qing’s army later defeated the Dashun army, which was led by 
Zicheng Li. The Qing Dynasty formally took power in 1644, and ruled China until 1911 when the 
Republic of China was founded. 
 
The Qing Dynasty was one of the several powers in the world in the seventeenth
 
century, 
and had reached an historic new high in economic development in the middle of the eighteenth
 
century, especially under the Kangxi Emperor and Qianlong Emperor.24 The population of China 
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reached 100 million under Kangxi and Qianlong.25 The Qing Dynasty lost its strength, however, 
after the Qianglong Emperor. The First Opium War between the Qing Dynasty and Britain 
(1839–1842) forced the Qing Dynasty to sign its first unequal treaty,26 the Treaty of Nanjing in 
1842 that was extended by the Treaty of Bogue in 1843. Under these treaties, five Chinese ports 
were opened to foreign trade, Hong Kong was ceded to Britain, and Britain was granted most-
favoured-nation status. The treaty fractured China’s sovereignty and self-image, and made China 
a passive object in international relations.27 Although the treaties were negotiated, their punitive 
clauses reflected the consequences of China’s military defeat.28 The Second Opium War further 
compromised the Qing Dynasty’s independence and sovereignty, and the Treaty of Tianjin and 
Convention of Beijing, signed around 1860, required the Qing Dynasty to cede more land to the 
British and Russian governments. Additional Chinese ports were  opened to foreigners and the 
import of opium was legalised after the war. 
 
Military defeat motivated the Qing Dynasty to adopt new policies to save the dynasty. The 
‘self-strengthening movement’ included initiatives to learn from the West and the adoption of 
modern technologies, with the main objective being ‘to protect China from further Western 
encroachments’. 29  Modern shipping yards and military factories were built, students were 
selected and sent abroad to study n ew technologies, and new education systems were proposed. 
All these institutions were tightly controlled by the state yet also dependent upon those Chinese 
individuals who had gained experience with foreign traders and had their own capital to invest. At 
the same time, ordinary Chinese citizens and their families began to think about entering business 
to take advantage of opportunities that these new policies potentially provided. They did so with 
an understanding of the significant risks that they would be undertaking. Our focus is not the 
institutions or companies controlled by the state or government bureaucrats, but rather the modern 
family firms established in mainland China after the Opium Wars of 1856–1860. We review the 
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development of Chinese family business in the Qing Dynasty in two periods, using the Sino-
Japanese War of Jiawu (1895) as a dividing point. 
From 1840 (The First Opium War) to 1895 (The War of Jiawu) 
 
Modern Chinese family business first took hold in the silk-reeling industry.30 It is well 
recognised that a feasible business plan is probably the most important issue to consider when 
starting up a business,31 and the choice of the industry, as part of the plan, may determine 
whether the business survives or not. Our analysis suggests that several factors may have led 
Chinese family businessmen initially to select the silk industry. First, the history of silk production 
in China dates back to the Zhou Dynasty (B.C. 1046 to B.C. 256) and China had a long-established 
tradition of trading silk with the West through the famous Silk Road, which had reached as far as 
the Roman Empire.32 As a result, silk reeling was a skill possessed by many Chinese, especially 
Chinese women. The supply of skilled labour would be met more readily if the silk industry were 
selected. Second, Chinese silk had enjoyed a huge international market for a long time. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the Qing Dynasty was required to open its doors to foreign trade; 
foreign businessmen were seen frequently in many Chinese ports. As a result, neither market 
demand nor transportation was a concern, reducing the need to invest capital to market the product. 
Lastly, before the Opium War, silk reeling in China was undertaken almost exclusively by hand. 
The introduction of modern manufacturing equipment to China after the war led Chinese 
businessmen to realise that mass production of silk reeling was possible.  
In the 1870s, Mr. Qiyuan Chen, a Chinese living in Vietnam, went back to his hometown 
and started the first modern manufacturing family firm in China’s history. These operations were 
so profitable that, at their peak, more than 300 silk-reeling factories were established in the 
province of Guangdong alone.33 As discussed earlier, all these companies were held by the family, 
and distinct from those controlled by the state or foreigners. Privately held family business was the 
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dominant ownership structure from 1872 to the turn of the century, while the state controlled only 
a number of traditional industries, such as salt and porcelain production.34 
 
Kaplan et al. use the analogy of the jockey and horse to describe the elements necessary 
to start up a successful business, with the former referring to entrepreneurs and the latter to 
business plans.35 They conclude that business plans are more important, ceteris paribus. The 
success of Chen’s silk-reeling factory may have been related to his having a plan and executing it 
well, but it may also underscore the importance of the entrepreneur. While it is often debated 
whether entrepreneurs are born or educated,36  Mr. Chen’s case suggests that both birth and 
education may have played a role. His business experience abroad, his risk-taking spirit, and his 
study of foreign operations in his home province all contributed to making him a successful 
businessman. 
 
Family involvement was also found in other industries during the period. Like silk reeling, 
several other industries were seemingly natural choices for Chinese business families to select. 
First, flourishing foreign trade made ship maintenance and repairs a necessity. The first generation 
of Chinese mechanics arose due to the demand for ship- repair-related work. I n t e n s i v e  
e f f o r t s ,  in conjunction with the introduction of the lathe, led some repair workshops to 
grow rapidly, especially in major ports such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. The Fachang 
Machinery shop in Shanghai was such an example,37 growing from a four or five-person 
workshop in the 1870s to a modern machinery manufacturer with about 200 employees in 1890. 
Second, like silk reeling, cotton textile manufacturing was also a tradition in China, and Chinese 
family businessmen invested heavily in this sector. Modern cotton manufacturing firms were first 
established in ports that were opened to foreigners during the Opium Wars. Third, family 
businesses also founded flour mills, match factories, paper mills, printing houses, oil pressing 
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mills, and lamp factories.38 Several of these factories, such as match factories, were the first in 
China’s history. 
 
In summary, modern family firms began to emerge after the Opium Wars. According to Xu 
and Wu,39 as of 1895, the year that witnessed the war between the Qing Dynasty and Japan, 
approximately 170 businesses could be classified as family enterprises. These firms were mainly 
manufacturing firms, while a few of them operated in the mining industry and several of them in 
the transportation industry. Over 60,000 were employed by these businesses. A careful analysis 
reveals the following patterns for Chinese family business during this period. First, since family 
businesses faced competition from state- or bureaucrat-controlled companies and foreign firms, 
they had to select an industry in which they could survive and grow. Then, as now, survival was 
the dominant challenge facing entrepreneurial firms. Early successful examples of the Chinese 
family business confirmed the importance of industry selection, with those in silk reeling and 
machinery repair thriving, but many firms in other industries, such as paper manufacturing, failing. 
According to Xu and Wu and Reed, local paper could not compete with imported paper, and this 
weakness was the main reason for operating failure.40  
 
Second, many family firms were founded by those with what we term ‘an entrepreneurial 
spirit’. As shown in Xu and Wu,41 most machinery repair factories were founded by the owners of 
blacksmith workshops. Some other firms, such as the Jichanglong Silk Reeling founded by Mr. 
Qiyuan Chen and t h e  Qiaoming Match Factory founded by M r .  Shenxuan Wei, were created 
by individuals who had engaged in business abroad but who had returned to their hometowns to 
start new enterprises. While abroad, these businessmen were exposed to modern production 
technology supported by steam engines, and were motivated to apply such technology to 
traditional industries, such as silk reeling, that had been in place for more than two thousand years 
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but relied on manual labour. Entrepreneurial spirit was crucial for the first generation of Chinese 
family firms. Facing tremendous pressure and exploitation from state or bureaucrat-owned 
enterprises and foreign companies, and with limited capital, these Chinese businessmen had to 
figure out a survival strategy, in which the taking of excessive risk was a feature. 
Third, inter-generational succession is considered by many family business scholars to be 
a key feature that differentiates the family business model from non-family firms.42 The first 
generation of Chinese family business confirms the role played by intra-family succession. The 
Fachang Machinery business in Shanghai was founded in 1866 by Mr. Juzan Fang, who was 
succeeded by his son, Mr. Yilv Fang. Yilv worked in his father’s workshop, and took over the 
company when he was 23 years old; under his leadership the Fachang business experienced its 
most significant growth.  
It is worth noting that Chinese entrepreneurs also experimented with some indigenous 
innovations. In Zelin’s description of Zigong’s salt manufacturing, both technical and organisational 
innovations were implemented by local businessmen and business families.43 Lineage trusts, for 
instance, were considered as one of the ‘most important developments’44 and represented ‘one of the 
most advanced business institutions of the late imperial period’.45 According to Ma, resources pooled 
by lineages played important roles, such as education funds for the next generation, the means to 
prepare the family business for family succession, and capital for potential business expansion.46 The 
lineage unions among Hui Merchants, as Ma points out, provided ‘credit, capital, and business 
partnership’ and lineage members were often the key personnel of the firm, such as managers. Such 
organisational forms gave the Hui Merchants great competitive advantage and helped them expand 
their market share dramatically. 
From 1895 (The War of Jiawu) to 1911 (the end of the Qing Dynasty) 
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The Opium Wars forced the Qing Dynasty to open its doors to foreign trade, and 
subsequently Chinese firms began to adopt modern production technology. After a series of 
military defeats and unequal treaties, the Qing Dynasty became a state in which feudalism and 
foreign imperialism co-existed. It was difficult for ordinary Chinese families to start a business 
in this environment, but the first generation of modern Chinese family firms did emerge in several 
industries during the next period. The first Sino-Japanese War, also known as the War of Jiawu 
(1894 to 1895), dramatically exacerbated the crisis and further pushed the Qing Dynasty to 
the edge of collapse. We examine in this sub-section the further development of Chinese family 
business after the War of Jiawu. 
 
The war placed the Qing Dynasty into deeper political, social, and economic crises. 
According to the Treaty of Maguan signed in 1895, the Qing paid a total of over 8,500 tons of 
silver to Japan as a war indemnity, and was forced to cede Penghu and Taiwan to Japan. In 1900, 
the Eight-Power Allied Forces (Britain, the USA, Germany, France, tsarist Russia, Japan, Italy, 
and Austria) invaded Beijing and forced the Qing governors to flee to Shanxi province. This defeat 
required the Qing to sign the Treaty of Xinchou in 1901. Under the treaty, the total payment made 
by the Qing Dynasty to the Alliance accounted for more than 10 times the annual fiscal income of 
the Qing. The War of Jiawu, the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Maguan) and the Treaty of Xinchou 
made many Chinese realise that their state was in an unprecedented crisis, and must be saved, 
amongst other means, through the further development of modern manufacturing. This wave of 
patriotism led existing family businesses to expand their operations, and new entrepreneurs to start 
their own enterprises. Thus, compared to the period before the War of Jiawu, the post-war period 
witnessed a rapid development of Chinese family business. 
 
The defeat in the War of Jiawu also led the Qing Dynasty to consider a series of new 
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policies favouring capitalism. The Guangxu Emperor, for instance, adopted a package of policy 
suggestions made by Youwei Kang representing a free capitalist ideology, hoping thereby to save 
the dynasty from the crisis. The fundamental objectives of the reform were to adopt market 
practices and promote privately held enterprises in manufacturing, commercial, banking, and other 
industries while limiting the role of the state in business activities. The reform, therefore, reflected 
an ideology that was fundamentally different from that of feudalism, and was consistent with trends 
in the capitalist world. The reform, however, failed after only about 100 days but it significantly 
promoted the ideology of capitalism, and greatly encouraged many Chinese to commence business 
activities to save the country. 
As Chan points out,47 two dominant types of firm existed in late imperial China: those with 
official status and those that involved setting up and managing private enterprises. Many successful 
family firms started with teams of brothers who excelled at different aspects,48 thus complementing 
each other in managing the family firm. Family members accounted for an overwhelming majority 
of management personnel. Liu Hongsheng, who founded the China Match Company, initially hired 
professional managers to run his factories. However, when his 13 children returned home after 
studying abroad, he replaced his professional management team with his sons and daughters.49 The 
participation of children in the business often led to dynamic tensions as the family sought to balance 
the empowerment and independence of the next generation with the authority of the founder and the 
view that family needs came before individual preferences.50 It was not unusual that later generations 
of brothers or cousins disagreed on business strategies and operations and divided the firm, such as 
in the case of the Kin Tye Lung Company.51  
Individual businessmen, who had gained their experience through working at Western firms, 
set up China’s first group of Western-style manufacturing firms during the 1870s.52 Such firms were 
established usually with other managers appointed by local governments. ‘Official supervised-
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merchant managed’ enterprises were a typical form of such state sponsorship,53 which, according to 
Chan,54  was the first stage of China’s modern-style enterprises, followed by ‘official-merchant 
jointly managed’ enterprises and ‘merchant-managed’ enterprises. Governmental support was crucial 
to the survival and growth of enterprises, but its deep involvement had potentially negative impacts 
contributing to the eventual demise of some firms. Lai analyses the China Merchants Steam 
Navigation Company,55 and shows that the company prospered when merchant managers operated 
the firm but faltered when government officials gained control and management of its operations. 
The first generation of Chinese entrepreneurs who started family businesses reflected a range 
of different backgrounds. Zhang Jian was an ‘official-turned-entrepreneur’,56 while Liu Hongsheng 
was a comprador for a British mining company.57 As noted in Hao,58 former compradors played 
crucial roles in promoting private enterprises, especially the family business model, in China’s early 
industrialisation. The process by which former compradors successfully started their own family 
businesses remains under-studied.59 However, Chan concludes from Liu Hongsheng’s case that prior 
experience as compradors enabled these individuals to launch their own businesses, first by exposing 
them to Western business management, then by expanding their business networks, and finally by 
providing start-up capital.60 
Family business in China continued to grow in the wake of China’s defeat. Dasheng, a 
shareholding company with limited liability, was a major family enterprise owned by Zhang Jian, 
and represented an historic shift from government-affiliated enterprises to privately owned and 
managed ones in modern China.61 Köll’s analysis of Dasheng’s governance, accounting, and control 
shows that both Western-style governance and China’s traditional arrangements played a crucial role 
in shaping the modern family business in China. According to Bian, Dasheng’s evolution represents 
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‘China’s long transition from the political economy of an agrarian society to that of an industrial 
society’.62  
Investment in traditional industries, such as silk reeling and cotton textiles, was significantly 
increased and expanded to provinces beyond coastal ones. New investments were also made in 
industries that had been emergent before the war. For instance, by 1913, two years after the demise 
of the Qing Dynasty, there were 57 flour mills, 91 machinery factories, and 64 match factories 
operated by family businesses.63 The cigarette industry was also newly emerging at this time. 
According to Xu and Wu, around 1906, roughly 16 cigarette factories were founded by Chinese 
business families.64 
 
During the post-Jiawu period, several Chinese family firms were newly founded, and 
have remained in operation ever since. ChangYu Wine Company, for instance, was established by 
Mr. Bishi Zhang in 1892, and marked the start of the industrialised production of wine in China.65 
His nephew, Mr. Chengqing Zhang, served as the first general manager of ChangYu. Over more 
than a century of growth, the company became one of the largest wine producers in Asia and a 
publicly listed company.  
 
Chinese family business experienced rapid expansion after the War of Jiawu, out of 
concern for saving the country from political and economic crises, and thanks to the increasing 
popularity of capitalism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the central government offered 
incentives to those who set up modern-style businesses. In January 1904, the government 
promulgated China’s first set of company laws to help protect the property rights of individual 
investors, 66  thus further boosting family business development. The overall effect was 
controversial however.67  
China’s Company Law followed the example of the laws in Japan and Britain and aimed 
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to create a better legal environmental for private business.68 It was supposed to be a milestone 
event in the industrialisation of modern China, but its effect was limited due to the lack of 
regulatory effort to support a capital market.69 Using Dasheng as an example, Goetzmann and Köll 
document that the changes did not bring about significant changes to family enterprises.70 For 
instance, board members of Dasheng served as auditors, who were under the immediate influence 
of the owner, Mr. Zhang Jian. Furthermore, it has been argued that the incorporation of Chinese 
family firms did not improve the protection of shareholders, nor did it help curb managerial 
power. 71  The Company Law did not provide specific regulation on financial reporting, thus 
rendering accounting reports from Chinese enterprises rather vague. Lack of transparency in 
financial reporting seems to be a necessary condition for family firms to extract private benefits,72 
and the deficiency in accounting regulation in the 1904 Company Law supports the observation of 
Köll that shareholders’ benefits were not protected.73   
Even with the existence of this Company Law, self-regulating activities still dominated, and 
much of the authority in this regard was granted to guilds.74 Furthermore, as Zelin notes, guilds were 
the principal members of the Chambers of Commerce, and commercial disputes, if they arose, were 
discussed and solved within the Chambers. In other words, business organisations, especially family 
businesses, continued to rely on guilds to regulate their market transactions. Such informal 
institutions proved to be more effective and efficient and less costly, given China’s market 
circumstances and institutional environment. In our view, family business in today’s China might 
gain insight from this history of self-regulation. 
According to Goetzmann and Köll,75 only a fraction of Chinese family firms registered with 
the Chinese government, as they feared that such registration might result in the loss of control over 
management and family wealth. Goetzmann and Köll also demonstrate that the actual controller and 
manager of Chinese family firms was not necessarily the majority shareholder, a common pattern 
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among Chinese shareholding companies in the early twentieth century.76 In their analysis of the 
ownership structure of Dasheng, Zhang Jian’s family owned only 6.4 per cent of all shares, 
suggesting the existence of a large number of minority shareholders.77  The protection of these 
minority interests continues to be the primary concern of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC, the Chinese counterpart of the US Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 Traditional industries continued to grow, and new industries were explored. Both successful 
(such as ChangYu) and unsuccessful firms (such as those in the cigarette industry) were founded. 
The then-flourishing family firms did not keep the Qing Dynasty from collapsing, but the emergence 
and initial growth of these companies did lay the foundation for family business development when 
the Republic of China (ROC), the first capitalist state in China’s history, was established. 
The Republic of China in Mainland China: from 1912 to 1949 
 
 
The Xinhai Revolution led by Yat-sen Sun eventually overthrew the Qing Dynasty, and led 
China into a republican era, that of the ROC. The ROC officially brought the end to over 2,000 
years of feudalism in China, and began the journey towards t h e  modernisation of China. 
The early decade of the ROC, from 1916 to 1928, was marked by frequent wars, and also known 
as the Warlord Era. The Kuomintang, the governing party of the ROC, reunited mainland China 
in 1928, but then entered into a war with Japan in 1937. After the war was ended in 1945, a civil 
war resumed between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, which saw the latter 
become the ruling power in 1949. The Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan. The Xinhai Revolution is 
considered by many to have been China’s bourgeois democratic revolution, and the ROC, despite 
its relatively short history in mainland China, played an unprecedented role in promoting modern 
capitalism. In the following paragraphs, we discuss family business development under the ROC 
during four periods, 1914–1920, 1921–1936, 1937–1945 and 1945–1949, as identified by Xu and 
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Wu.78 
 
 
 
From World War I to 1920 
 
Family-run business gained great momentum during World War I; it was claimed as the 
‘Golden Time’ of development.79  There were several contributing factors. First, the end of 
feudalism with the collapse of the Qing Dynasty opened the door for capitalism. Second, the 
Xinhai Revolution and the establishment of the ROC motivated the Chinese public/business 
community to contribute to the new China by devoting both effort and capital to modern business 
activities, and also played a significant educational role. Due to the boycott against foreign products, 
demand for domestically produced goods also increased. Lastly, the development of family 
business in China had been severely constrained by foreign investment and had faced fierce 
competition in its home market, especially as foreign investment had enjoyed most-favoured-
nation status in China. World War I reduced these external pressures on family business in China. 
As noted earlier, the cotton textile industry was one of the major industries favoured by 
family businessmen. It enjoyed double- digit growth during World War I and the period 
immediately after the war, and profitability reached an historic high.80  Several giant groups 
emerged during this time, including the well-known Rong family.81 The Rong brothers founded 
their first cotton factory in 1916, but in a short period of time expanded it into a nine-factory group, 
the biggest family firm in the cotton textile industry. 
 
Similarly, the Liu family of Shanghai expanded its operations and took advantage of its 
opportunities in matches, cement, woollens and textiles to provide the basis for a multi-generational 
business. It also made use of network connections, including political ones, to further its interests 
and to position the family business amidst the dynamic events of the twentieth century.82 
Flour mills grew rapidly during this period as well, as World War I put a great demand on 
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industrial production to supply troops. According to Xu and Wu,83 86 new mills were established 
between 1914 and 1920, and China became an exporter of flour during the war. Similar to the 
cotton textile industry, large family groups dominated flour production. The Rong brothers 
founded their first flour mill in 1903 and owned 12 such factories during the war. The return on 
assets during this period for flour production well exceeded 100 per cent.84 Silk reeling was the 
first industry to see family business emerge, but its development was not as rapid as that 
experienced by other industries during the war. Japan had become the major player in the world 
market for silk production.85 In addition to these major industries, family businesses continued 
to develop in other sectors, including match production, machinery, chemistry, and cement. They 
also entered new industries during the war, such as paint production and rubber. 
 
From 1921 to 1936 
 
Family business in China experienced a period of slow development after World War I. 
Renewed conflicts among warlords devastated the social and economic lives of the Chinese 
population. More than 140 wars constrained further development of family business; the Central 
Plains War in 1930 alone was reported to have caused over 300,000 casualties. In addition, foreign 
investment in China after World War I dominated many industries, which directly affected family 
firms’ survival and growth. 
 
The cotton industry was still one of the major industries in mainland China, but market 
conditions had changed dramatically. 86  Japanese firms expanded their investment in an 
unprecedented fashion, and became the major supplier of textile materials in mainland China. As 
Xu and Wu comment, imports by foreign textile firms were the dominant force in the cotton 
industry, but thanks to the Golden Period during World War I, exports exceeded imports at the end 
of 1930. The success of Japanese cotton companies in China again put family business in China 
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under the competitive pressure of foreign capital. Japanese cotton factories were believed to have 
more up-to-date technology and better personnel management, giving them competitive 
advantages over family-controlled Chinese firms. Japanese competitors’ operating advantages, 
along with the shock resulting from the Great Depression, caused tremendous difficulties for their 
Chinese counterparts; many Chinese family businesses in the cotton industry were acquired by 
Japanese firms during the 1930s. It is worth noting that, in the 1980s, when China opened its 
doors to foreign investment, Japanese textile companies operating in mainland China were still 
enjoying competitive advantages in technology and management, which forced many state-owned 
Chinese textile factories to close down or to reform regulations regarding the property rights of 
investors. Technology application and innovation, personnel management, and cost management 
have long been competitive advantages of Japanese firms.87 
 
Compared to many family-run firms that struggled to survive and grow during this period, 
the Rong family group continued to grow exponentially. By the 1930s, the Rong family owned 
nine textile factories in addition to their investments in other industries.88 The expansion of the 
Rong family group relied heavily on bank loans, which allowed it to acquire other cotton factories 
that were experiencing operating d i f f i cu l t i e s . Access to capital provided by banks and other 
financial institutions has always been critical for family firms, especially privately held ones,89 and 
more than half of the privately held firms around the world are known to rely on bank debt (or debt 
financing).90 Such access to external capital is particularly important for privately held family 
businesses, as these firms lack access to public equity markets; borrowing from banks enables 
them to maintain control, which is the dominant concern for family-controlled business.91 
 
The Rong group’s access to and reliance on bank loans were crucial in this period. As 
mentioned earlier, the Japanese textile companies were bigger and stronger and took advantage 
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of economies of scale, which allowed them to reduce their operating costs to a much greater extent 
than could their Chinese counterparts. To compete with Japanese companies, growing bigger 
seemed to h a v e  been the obvious choice, but i t  i s  not c o m p l e t e l y  clear how the 
Rong family successfully gained support from its lenders. Several factors may account for its 
financing success. First, the banking and finance sector (not covered in this study due to our focus 
on manufacturing) also gained great momentum after World War I. Stated simply, the supply of 
bank loans was increased. Second, anti-Japan activities, prevalent throughout the modern history 
of China, were especially so after the War of Jiawu. In the early 1930s, Japan occupied North 
Eastern China, which further motivated China to fight against Japan and boycott its businesses. 
The Rong family business, as a symbol of Chinese family-run enterprise, may have received 
support from banks that were also owned by Chinese businessmen. Third, the Rong family 
had early success in other industries, such as the operation of flour mills. As a result, it may 
have been able to provide more collateral to secure loans. Lastly, as North comments,92 personal 
exchange and relationships dominate economic activities in China. The Rong family had 
remained successful since starting its  business in the late nineteenth century. Its 
accumulated social capital likely would have helped it to access bank financing.  
Flour mills and silk reeling remained major industries during this period, but development 
was slow.93  The tobacco industry grew dramatically; 118 tobacco factories were founded by 
Chinese business families over a four-year period in Shanghai alone.94 
 
From 1937 to 1945 
 
As noted earlier, the War of Jiawu, the first major war between China and Japan, pushed 
China into financial bankruptcy. The second Sino-Japanese war occurred between 1937 and 1945, 
within the broader conflicts of World War II. The war cost the lives of 15 million Chinese nationals, 
and forced 60 to 95 million people to abandon their homes.95 In 1931, Japan invaded the north-
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eastern region of China, and created the puppet Manchu State (1932–1945). Therefore, part of 
China was under the actual control of Japan from 1931 to 1945. From 1937 to 1945, Japan 
occupied many provinces of mainland China and, as a result, we discuss family business first 
in regions occupied by Japan, and then in regions outside the war zones. 
 
 
Family business in regions occupied by Japan 
 
Building on the work of Xu and Wu,96 we discuss several key industries in regions occupied 
by Japan, including cotton factories, flour production and silk reeling. Chinese family business was 
not eliminated by the war in these provinces, but its survival and development was extremely 
difficult. Before the war, Chinese family businesses were competing fiercely with Japanese-
invested textile companies in the cotton production industry, but many factories were seized by the 
Japanese government during the war. As documented by Xu and Wu, a number of very small cotton 
factories were founded during the war, to escape Japanese oversight and control, as these small 
firms were relatively easy to move. Flour production continued to be important, as it was needed 
to support the troops. Similar to the cotton industry, many small flour mills were founded during 
the war because of their flexibility. As Xu and Wu note, about 400 such mills existed in t h e  
provinces occupied by Japan. Silk reeling was another industry in which Chinese firms 
competed with their Japanese counterparts for global markets. During the war, many Chinese firms 
were destroyed or seized by the Japanese army, and again small silk-reeling factories became 
popular. Therefore, in the provinces occupied by Japan, family-owned and operated Chinese 
businesses faced extremely high operating risk. Such companies were under the tight control of 
the Japanese, but some managed to survive.  
Family business in regions outside the war zones 
 
As Xu and Wu indicate,97 about 600 factories owned and run by Chinese businessmen were 
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moved to provinces outside the war zones. These companies played a great role in supporting 
the economy and the army. Given the demand placed by military forces, new investments made by 
Chinese business families focused on heavy industries, such as steel production and machinery, 
but traditional industries, such as cotton, still accounted for a large part of the family-run sector.98 
It is perhaps not surprising that steel manufacturing became the favourite of Chinese 
business families; about 100 steel companies existed in provinces outside the war zones.99 Steel 
production was considered the lifeline of modern manufacturing, and this was especially the case 
during wartime. This trend continued after the PRC was founded in 1949.  Steel production was 
also claimed by authorities to be the key pillar of economic development. During the Great Leap 
Forward, small furnaces could be found throughout the country. Investment in the steel production 
industry during the war had several features. First, many family-controlled steel companies were 
built based on the factories that had been moved in from other provinces that were occupied by the 
Japanese. Second, these family-run businesses were the dominant suppliers of steel for military 
and production use during the first several years of the war. Third, it appeared that Chinese 
businessmen, although pursuing their profits to the largest extent, w e r e  still showing their 
patriotism. Lastly, many firms appointed those with education and work experience abroad as 
their CEOs, as technology was the key for these firms to succeed as these skills were linked 
to the technological knowledge critical for firm success. 
 
Like those family firms in the provinces occupied by the Japanese, many family businesses 
in the provinces outside the war zones preferred to be smaller in size. When the Japanese invaded, 
many businesses did not have a chance to move their operations to the war-free zone; some 
equipment was too big to be moved due to the lack of transportation. Given the uncertain nature of 
the war, many family firms decided to reduce their operating size, and were prepared to move again, 
if necessary. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) are the engine of economic development, 
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and have played an indispensable role in economic growth and employment.100 It is not unlikely 
that such SMEs were playing a similar role in the war-free zone at this time. Today, many privately 
held SMEs frequently engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and aspire to grow bigger, 
with some considering an initial public offering (IPO) the ultimate sign of success.101 
However, being small was critical for family firms in the war-free zone during this period. In 
addition to increased flexibility, being small may have enabled many of these family firms to 
effectively and efficiently manage their workforce. Lack of skilled management had long been a 
concern for family firms in China, even though they could purchase advanced equipment. The lack 
of effective management resulted in lower efficiency and higher operating costs, explaining in part 
the competitive disadvantage many Chinese family firms had faced relative to Japanese and other 
foreign companies. 
 
Coble argues that the war devastated family businesses in China.102 Yet he further shows 
that firms adopted various strategies to deal with the war and the Japanese occupation. The Rong 
family, according to Coble, did not relocate its companies to the war-free zone, and most family 
businesses in the textile and consumer industries remained where they were. Such firms partially 
collaborated with the Japanese authorities or their puppet agency in order to survive. The 
adaptability of Chinese family business during wartime remains an interesting issue. According to 
Coble, the Rong family tried its best to avoid working with the Japanese occupation, but made 
significant compromises to ensure its survival. 
The Liu family adopted a strategy of dispersing the family to locations deemed strategic, 
including those under Japanese occupation and those that were not. This strategy relied upon the 
patriarchal authority of Liu Hongsheng and was maintained as an over-arching policy when the 
Lius were confronted with the political and economic impacts of the post-war era.103 
The south-western part of China was relatively under-developed before the war, 
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compared to the coastal provinces. The relocation of many family firms to these south-western 
provinces encouraged entrepreneurial activities there. Along with a number of other factors, 
increased investment in other industries, such as steel production, contributed to the restructuring 
of family business investment and also to the winning of the war. While many Chinese firms 
adapted and survived, the second China-Japan war, between 1937 and 1945, caused irreversible 
damage to many others.  When the central government of the ROC moved to Chong Qing in 
1937, many family firms made the decision to move there as well. 
 
From 1945 to 1949 
 
When the war ended in August 1945, wartime demand was eliminated.  In the first several 
months after the war, most family businesses in the war-free zone experienced a significant drop 
in production and sales. Yet, the end of the war was great news and triggered a new wave of 
investment by business families. According to Xu and Wu, 1,992 and 9,285 family firms were 
newly founded or reopened in 1946 and 1947, respectively.104 Many firms that had relocated to the 
war-free zone returned to the coastal provinces and cities, such as Shanghai. 
The textile industry benefited the most from the end of the war. As noted earlier, Japanese 
textile companies were the main competitors of Chinese family businesses. The defeat in the war 
destroyed many Japanese companies that had been operating in China and some of them were 
acquired by Chinese firms. The sudden lack of competition gave Chinese cotton factories great 
momentum to expand their markets, while the import of raw materials from the USA significantly 
reduced the cost of raw materials.105 The Rong family continued to be the largest capital group in 
China in the post-war period. Like many business families, the family business was divided into 
focused groups after the war. The silk-reeling industry had been the first in China to attract family 
investment, but had experienced a dramatic recession even before the war because of its inability 
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to compete successfully with Japanese exports. Silk-reeling companies, which operated in the 
occupied provinces during the war, were exploited and controlled by the Japanese. The industry 
did not fully recover after the war, and the resumption of civil war, discussed next, made the 
situation even worse. 
 
The post-war period of peace was short in China. The civil war between the ROC led by 
the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CCP) resumed in full scale in 1946. Some 
Chinese family businessmen decided to leave mainland China, but many others opted to stay. The 
Kuomintang, the leading political party at this time, was defeated in the civil war and many attributed 
its defeat, amongst other factors, to party corruption.106 Family firms in mainland China had been 
exploited by the bureaucrats and foreign capital. The end of World War II led some businesspeople 
to believe that they would now experience a golden period of growth, but their dream was crushed 
by government corruption. Members of the Rong family, for instance, were subject to extortion 
and abduction after the China-Japan war, and had to pay significant sums of money to regain their 
freedom. The level of corruption put a hold on the continuing development of family firms in 
mainland China, despite the end of the war. 
 
In 1947, amid the civil war, the central government of the ROC issued a series of economic 
policies, which imposed further regulations on family-controlled businesses and led to the 
bankruptcy of many family firms. In the meantime, the CCP gained increasing control.107 
Discussion 
 
This study has implicitly drawn upon the embeddedness of Chinese family business within 
its institutional environment as a means to examine its historical development. As Uzzi argues,108 
research on embeddedness merits attention as it helps improve our understanding of how social 
structure, amongst other things, shapes economic life. In recognition of the contingent nature of 
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economic activities, Zukin and DiMaggio suggest four categories of embeddedness: cognitive, 
cultural, structural, and political.109  Cognitive embeddedness refers to the ways in which ‘the 
structured regularities of mental processes limit the exercise of economic reasoning’,110  while 
cultural embeddedness refers to the role of ‘shared collective understanding in shaping strategies 
and goals’.111 Structural embeddedness denotes the ‘contextualization of economic exchange in 
patterns of ongoing interpersonal relations’,112 and political embeddedness, alternatively, involves 
‘the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that 
involves economic actors and nonmarket institutions, particularly the state and social classes’.113 
Similarly, in the context of China during the late imperial period, family business emerged and its 
economic organisation, style, and behaviour were embedded in China’s cultural, social, and political 
context.114   
Chai argues that family business in China originated in the late imperial period as a result of 
the interaction between Confucianism and rational decision making.115 Strategic uncertainty arose 
in the late imperial period, due to the invasion by foreign powers and the introduction of capitalism, 
the weakening of state control, the lack of institutions for enforcing contracts, and the advancement 
of new manufacturing technology. As a result, according to Chai, family business was built on 
mutual trust among individuals and family members who shared a common set of social norms.116 
Confucianism and ‘kinship-based Confucian capitalism’ became a rational choice for doing 
business preferred by business actors,117 suggesting that family business as a unique organisational 
form was imbedded in, and to some extent shaped by, its cultural environment. Reliance on these 
shared social norms reduced the transaction costs of doing business, albeit at the risk of a loss of 
efficiency. 
Traditional Chinese culture was also characterised by high power distance and filial piety.118 
The head of the Chinese household had patriarchal authority, did not want to share his authority 
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with others, and expected other family members to obey his authority. When these individuals 
started their businesses, they might naturally have selected a family business to extend their 
authority from the household to the business, thereby exerting and maintaining control. In other 
words, familism in Chinese society represented ‘a way of organizing’, and this ‘model of group 
formation’ contributed to the adoption of the family business as a preferred style of economic 
organisation.119 As Hamilton argues, the heads of ordinary Chinese households were the driving 
force behind capitalism in the late imperial period, and individual entrepreneurs and the family 
business model played a crucial role in shaping economic activities. These entrepreneurs and family 
businesses were ‘embedded in extensive regional commercial networks’,120  which represented 
another key element of Chinese society, social capital or Guanxi.121 
In addition to cultural embeddedness, Chua and Chrisman document that historical 
developments in China might also have led entrepreneurs to prefer the family business model.122 
Historical realities in China witnessed the frequent replacement of one dynasty by another, incessant 
wars and power struggles. Business owners with an intention for intra-family succession might 
indeed have been concerned, therefore, that able managers could have taken over the business or 
established a competing one.123 To avoid such a possibility and to better conserve the family’s 
control and wealth, business owners preferred to employ those with blood relations and distant 
relatives when necessary. When opportunities arose in the late imperial period to start a modern-
style business, a family-centred one would seem to have been the natural choice. 
Political embeddedness characterised the environment of family business in the late imperial 
period. After foreign powers forced the Qing Emperors to open the border and imposed unequal 
treaties, foreigner-run businesses and state-owned enterprises co-existed and dominated economic 
activities in China. Individual Chinese entrepreneurs and family businessmen might have had the 
opportunity to join such companies, and some of them did indeed work for these firms. Yet, many 
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also had the intention of starting, controlling, and perpetuating their own business, along the lines 
of their own households.124 The family business structure allowed them to limit firm size, to create 
flexibility, and to target markets under-served by foreign and state powers. Furthermore, some 
Chinese were not willing to work for either foreigners or the corrupt imperial state, and attempted 
to start up their own businesses, in the modern sense, to save the country. In other words, their 
economic activities were embedded in the political context of late imperial China, and reflected, at 
least in part, their political agenda as well. In sum, family business represented a unique and feasible 
organisational form in late imperial China, and one whose operations and structures were strongly 
embedded in the prevailing institutional context. 
 
 
Conclusion and future research 
This study provides historical evidence on the development of family business in mainland 
China; between 1872, when the first modern manufacturing firm was established by a Chinese 
businessman, and 1949, when the ROC was founded. This period is an important one in the history 
of China, during which the nation experienced tremendous political, economic, social, and cultural 
turmoil. Mainland China became a semi-colonial country during the late Qing Dynasty, adopted 
capitalism in 1911 when the ROC was founded, and saw the establishment of socialist China in 
1949. 
Firstly, the treaty system denied China the right to conduct foreign trade with Western powers 
on an equal basis.125 Chinese Maritime Customs, set up after the war, was completely controlled and 
used by Western powers to govern China’s foreign trade during the treaty port era.126 It has long been 
argued that intrusion by Western powers damaged China’s economic growth,127 but recent studies 
show that, between the 1860s and the 1940s, the number of new products imported by China grew 
significantly, at a rate that was 50 per cent faster than the comparable percentage in the USA from 
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1970 to 2000.128 The availability of new products in China opened the eyes of Chinese entrepreneurs 
and created possibilities for new (family) businesses. Further research is needed to understand the 
impact of this import diversity.  
Secondly, Ho and Li demonstrate that some significant historic events, to which historians 
attach great importance, such as the civil wars in China in the first several decades of the twentieth 
century (e.g., the Northern Expedition, the Central Plain War, the War between Nationalists and 
Communists), failed to produce break points in China’s then bond market.129 In other words, the 
break points produced by their economic model did not correspond to some historic events, despite 
their significance. It is therefore both interesting and important to examine how family firms adapted 
to changes in their environment in general and reacted to specific events in particular. One possible 
avenue may lie in the political connections that some family firms enjoyed.  
Thirdly, historians and business history researchers continue to debate key issues concerning 
the means by which the Chinese family business group was managed. In contrast to the prior 
perceptions of historians in mainland China that business groups, such as the Rong family business, 
operated in pre-war China using a hierarchical structure, evidence presented by Chan suggests that 
firms within the Rong group were quite independent in terms of marketing, purchasing, financing, 
and so on.130 This argument raises an interesting question about how Chinese business families 
managed their diverse enterprises. Whether these family firms were run as a unified unit in which a 
hierarchical structure was imposed, or as a decentralised organisation in which each business unit 
had authority to make its own decisions, could provide important implications for family firms in 
China today, as they expand their operational scale and scope.  
Finally, as noted earlier, some Chinese family businesses evolved from state-sponsored to 
private enterprises, reflecting a process of partial privatisation, which resembles the partial 
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privatisation process that has been taking place since China’s openness reform of 1978. Yet, research 
has not been conclusive whether state involvement played a negative or a positive role. Further study 
from an historical perspective might shed light on this issue. Liu,131 for instance, describes the 
Hanyeping Company, which emerged as the largest iron and steel firm in East Asia in the 1900s. The 
company was under state control for most of this time. The history of Hanyeping witnessed constant 
failures of corporate governance and frequent cases of fraud. However, its third stage, the period 
during which the firm was run by private merchants, is not examined by Liu.  
It is impossible in one study to fully address family business developments of this period. 
As a result, we have accounted for what we consider to be the most significant events and 
milestones in chronological order, and when possible have used typical family firms to provide 
illustrative examples. At this juncture, our analyses are primarily descriptive, and sacrifice depth in 
order to provide a relatively holistic picture over a long period of time. Nonetheless, our analysis 
indicates that Chinese family firms adapted to their institutional environment to develop strategies 
and structures adapted to their specific circumstances and context. 
 
Our research a l s o  relies on evidence from manufacturing industries. Given the 
complex nature of family business development in mainland China before 1949, future studies at a 
more micro level would shed additional light on this important sector and also on specific industries. 
Family businesses in mainland China invested in many other areas of endeavour, from commercial 
services, banking and financial services, to transportation. Evidence obtained from studies focusing 
on these areas would provide the basis for comparative analyses. Similarly, given the extensive 
literature on family firms founded by Chinese entrepreneurs in other regions and countries, research 
comparing family firms in mainland China with those in other regions merits consideration. 
While responding to Chua and Chrisman,132 we limit our analysis to enterprises founded, 
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owned and managed by business families in mainland China. Our initial research has led us to 
consider the existence of a hybrid form of business organisation in which both Chinese business 
families and bureaucrats founded the firm. This unique hybrid form may reflect an early form of 
political connection, one that has been studied extensively by researchers in economics, finance, 
management, and accounting.133 Research examining political connections from an historical 
perspective would contribute another dimension to this stream of literature, in particular by 
underscoring historical antecedents of current organisational forms. 
 
Our study does not examine how individual family firms in mainland China have evolved 
and adapted over time. Many firms founded more than a century ago presently exist. A case study 
making effective use of archival sources and investigating such firms, their strategies and their 
longevity would be a fruitful area for further research to shed new light on such topics.  
Several important themes are worthy of further examination, such as the household division 
of work and responsibilities in the family business, intra-family succession, and family firm 
financing.134 While neglected in the current study, primarily to maintain our focus, the important 
nature of such themes merits further discussion. We encourage future research to help improve our 
understanding, especially by using a comparative perspective to examine family business in the pre-
1949 period relative to family business in today’s China. First, household division of work and 
patriarchy in Chinese family firms are important dimensions. As Hamilton notes,135 the oldest male 
in the family tends to assume the leadership role in the family business, thus extending and exerting 
control from the family to the business. Yet, Chinese history also provides numerous examples in 
which a female figure dominated all aspects of family life and business. During the past decades, 
family business in China has also seen women and married couples take control. It would, therefore, 
be interesting to compare family business in the twenty-first century with that in the pre-1949 period, 
highlighting changes and implications for business management and growth. 
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Second, succession is a key issue facing all family businesses, as business families want 
future generations to retain the business within the same family, enabling the family to enjoy both 
financial wealth and family-centred non-economic value, i.e., socio-emotional wealth.136 Family 
business owners in today’s China may have different concerns about this issue, compared to their 
counterparts in the pre-1949 period, as a consequence of the implementation of the one-child 
policy.137 Furthermore, the next generation has been frequently reluctant to work in the family 
business, exacerbating the succession issue. As a result, investigation of family business succession 
across these two periods may indeed add insight into family business management and business 
history research. 
Lastly, family business financing, like other entrepreneurial financing, has proved 
challenging. Family goals, either financial or non-financial, could be compromised if the family 
were unable to raise sufficient funds at an acceptable cost of capital. The Rong family’s financing 
strategy and success in the pre-1949 period helped the business to grow into one of the best-known 
family businesses in China.138 However, such a strategy might not apply to present-day Chinese 
firms due to the different financial institutions that prevail today and the existence of emerging 
capital markets. Future research is needed to shed light on the impacts of different financing 
practices over time. 
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